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Although the federal No Child Left Behind program judges the effectiveness of 
schools based on their students’ achievement status, many policy analysts argue that 
schools should be measured, instead, by their students’ achievement growth. Using a ten-
year student-level panel dataset from North Carolina, we examine how school-specific 
pressure associated with the two approaches to school accountability affects student 
achievement at different points in the prior-year achievement distribution. Achievement 
gains for students below the proficiency cut point emerge in response to both types of 
accountability systems. In contrast to prior research highlighting the possibility of 
educational triage, we find little or no evidence that schools in North Carolina ignore the 
students far below proficiency under either approach. Importantly, we find that the status, 
but not the growth, approach reduces the reading  achievement of higher performing 
students, with the losses in the aggregate exceeding the gains at the bottom. Our analysis 
suggests that the distributional effects of accountability pressure depend not only on the 




High on the U.S. educational policy agenda is how best to hold schools 
accountable for the performance of their students. One of the goals of any accountability 
policy is to shorten the feedback loops between policymakers, principals and teachers. 
With standards based accountability programs, policy makers set clear standards, 
measure student performance, and use those measures to evaluate the effectiveness of 
schools (Cohen, 1996; O'Day & Smith, 1993). Successful schools are then typically 
provided rewards in the form of public recognition, financial bonuses for teachers or 
some combination of both. Unsuccessful schools may be sanctioned or provided 
additional support, depending on whether the system is designed to be punitive or 
constructive. The ultimate goal of a standards based accountability system is to generate 
greater student achievement consistent with the standards (Figlio & Ladd, 2008; Ladd, 
1996).  
With the passage of the federal No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) in early 2002, 
for better or for worse, student test scores in math and reading have come to represent the 
outputs of interest, regardless of their relationship to any specific curriculum standard, 
and schools are judged primarily on the academic status of their students. In particular, 
NCLB requires every U.S. public school to test all students annually in reading and math 
in grades 3-8 and once in high school, requires each state to set annual targets for the 
percentages of students meeting a state-determined proficiency standard in order to reach 
the goal of 100 percent proficiency by 2013/14, and includes sanctions for schools that 
fail to make the required adequate yearly progress (AYP) toward that goal. In addition, it 
holds schools accountable not only for the overall performance of their students but also 
for that of racial and economic subgroups. Among the many criticisms of NLCB are that 
3 
 
the proficiency standards differ across states, the focus on math and reading narrows the 
curriculum, holding schools accountable for annual progress increases the instability of 
school performance measures, more diverse schools are more likely to be penalized, and 
the goal of 100 percent proficiency is unrealistic (Amrien & Berliner, 2002; Balfanz et 
al., 2007; Figlio, 2005, 2006; Hamilton et al., 2005; Kane & Staiger, 2002; Linn, 2000; 
Peterson & Hess, 2006).  
Despite these criticisms, many people believe that test-based accountability can 
be a useful strategy for raising student achievement, especially for low-performing 
students. The theory of action behind educational accountability is that by setting 
standards and measuring performance relative to standards, teachers will work harder and 
students will learn more. Increasingly, however, observers have argued for shifting the 
metric for school accountability away from the achievement status of a school’s students, 
as is the case under NCLB, in favor of a metric based on students’ growth in achievement 
during the year (Hanushek & Raymond, 2005; Ladd & Walsh, 2002; Toch & Harris, 
2008).  
The argument for using achievement growth rather than achievement status as the 
basis of school accountability is two-fold. First, because children come to school with 
different degrees of readiness to learn and prior achievement levels, many people believe 
it is unfair, and potentially unproductive, to expect schools alone to offset the effects of 
the background characteristics of their students. Instead, the argument goes, schools 
should be held accountable for outcomes over which they have more control, such as how 
much the children learn during the year, typically measured by their gains in test scores. 
Second, the focus on achievement status, as defined by a proficiency threshold, provides 
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a strong incentive for schools to focus attention on students near the threshold to the 
potential disadvantage of students far below the threshold and of those above the 
threshold. This distributional aspect of status based accountability programs has received 
significant attention in the recent literature (Ballou & Springer, 2008; Booher-Jennings, 
2005; Krieg, 2008; Neal & Schanzenbach, Forthcoming; Reback, 2008). At the same 
time, some growth models have been criticized for lack of transparency and their failure 
to require students to meet specific standards.  
The distributional effects of accountability systems are the focus of this paper. In 
contrast to recent research, which has focused almost exclusively on the distributional 
effects of status programs such as NCLB, we compare the distributional effects of a 
system based on achievement status to one based on achievement growth. We are able to 
compare the two approaches because our empirical work is based on longitudinal data 
from North Carolina where schools have been subject to a growth based accountability 
system since 1996/97 and ever since 2002/03 have also been subject to the status 
requirements of NCLB. Given the increasing national policy interest in moving to growth 
models of accountability our comparison of the distributional effects of the two 
approaches is timely.  
Specifically, in this empirical study we use student-level data over time to 
compare and contrast how school-specific pressure associated with the two approaches to 
school accountability affects student achievement at different points in the prior-year 
achievement distribution. The availability of consistent test score data over time allows 
for careful modeling of student achievement gains, including the use of student fixed 
effects to account for time-invariant characteristics of students such as their ability. 
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Consistent with our theoretical predictions about how schools facing accountability 
pressure are likely to respond, we find evidence of achievement gains for students below 
the proficiency cut point for both types of accountability systems. The approaches differ, 
however, in their effects on student performance at the high end of the distribution. In 
contrast to the gains approach, the status approach generates achievement losses for 
higher performing students that, in the aggregate, exceed the gains at the bottom. We find 
that the aggregate gains to students at the bottom of the distribution in the affected 
schools would have to be weighted at 2-3 times those at the top to justify the losses at the 
higher end.  
Achievement effects of school accountability programs 
 The most convincing studies of how accountability affects overall achievement 
emerge from cross-state studies such as Carnoy and Loeb (2002), Hanushek and 
Raymond (2005) or from careful district-specific studies that permit comparisons to other 
districts such as Jacob (2005) or Ladd (1999). These and other studies are reviewed in 
Figlio and Ladd (2008). Emerging from research of this type is that the introduction of a 
school-based accountability program generally raises achievement when achievement is 
measured by the high-stakes test used in the accountability system. Some studies also 
report positive achievement effects when achievement is measured by a low-stakes test, 
such as the National Assessment of Education Progress (NAEP) as in Carnoy and Loeb 
(2002) and Hanushek and Raymond (2005), or by a low-stakes state test as in Jacob 
(2005) but in this latter case only in the higher grades. In general, when achievement 
gains do emerge, they tend to be larger for math than for reading.  
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Research has also found, however, that high stakes testing can narrow and 
fragment the curriculum, promote rote, teacher-directed instruction, and encourage 
schools to teach test-preparation skills rather than academic content, tendencies that may 
be stronger in schools with high minority and low income populations (Amrien & 
Berliner, 2002; Darling-Hammond, 2004; Linn, 2000; Nichols & Berliner, 2007; Orfield 
& Kornhaber, 2001; Valenzuela, 2005). Moreover, in schools facing accountability 
pressure, teachers and principals may manipulate the test-taking pool through selective 
disciplinary practices and reclassifying students as requiring special educational services, 
thereby making them ineligible for tests. In addition, and of particular relevance for the 
present study, they may focus instruction and extra resources on those students most 
likely to improve a school’s external standing (Booher-Jennings, 2005; Figlio, 2006; 
Weitz & Rosenbaum, 2007).  
Our main question is how school accountability affects achievement at different 
points in the achievement distribution in the schools under the most pressure to raise 
achievement. Four distributional questions are of particular interest. The first, and most 
basic, is whether there are any within-school distributional effects, that is, whether 
accountability pressure is associated with greater gains in achievement for students at 
some points in the prior-year achievement distribution than at others. Unless an 
accountability system is specifically intended to change the distribution of student 
outcomes within schools, such distributional effects may well not be desirable. Second, to 
the extent that there are distributional effects, do the largest benefits accrue to students at 
the low end of the distribution? Such an outcome would be deemed desirable provided 
the goal of the accountability system were to raise the achievement of low-achieving 
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students in low-performing schools, but less so if the goal were to raise achievement 
across the board in such schools. Third, to what extent do trade-offs emerge between 
gains to students at the bottom of the distribution and achievement losses to those at the 
top? Making policy judgments about such tradeoffs requires information on how society 
values achievement gains and losses for students at different points in the achievement 
distribution. Fourth, to what extent is there evidence of educational triage, in the sense 
that additional resources are focused on students around a designated threshold to the 
detriment of those far from the threshold? Of particular concern is that students at the 
very bottom of the achievement distribution may be so far below the threshold that they 
are worse off under the accountability system than they otherwise would be.  
Several recent studies using different methodologies and data sets address one or 
more of these questions in the context of status based accountability systems that measure 
school success by student passing rates. Receiving most attention in the literature is the 
issue of educational triage. Booher-Jennings (2005) provides qualitative evidence from a 
single school and its associated urban school district in Texas that teachers do indeed 
respond to incentives to increase pass rates as one would expect, namely by focusing 
additional attention on students near the passing rate. Based on careful quantitative 
analysis, Neal and Schanzenbach (forthcoming) document that the introduction of two 
separate accountability systems in Chicago induced schools to focus on students near the 
middle of the achievement distribution to the disadvantage of the students at the two tails 
of the distribution, while Krieg (2007) reports similar findings for Washington State. In 
contrast, in their quantitative study of NCLB in 7 states based on test data from the 
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Northwest Evaluation Association, Ballou and Springer (2008) find little or no evidence 
of adverse effects for the lowest performers.
1
  
More generally, Ballou and Springer (2008) find evidence of gains to students at 
the bottom of the distribution, but find no consistent evidence that schools facing 
accountability pressure neglect their high achieving students to focus on low achievers. A 
study by Reback (2008) based on Texas data during the 1990s also generally finds 
positive effects on the very low achievers. Contrary to the triage hypothesis, Reback finds 
that when a school has a realistic chance of improving its accountability rating, the lowest 
performing students make greater than expected gains, even if they have no chance of 
passing the exam in that subject. In addition, Reback uncovers some intriguing 
distributional differences by subject. His evidence suggests that schools respond to 
incentives related to math in ways that increase the performance of low performing 
students with at most small adverse effects on higher achieving students. In reading, by 
contrast, except in certain cases, school-wide incentives to raise student performance on 
the reading exam appear to harm students who have a moderate to strong probability of 
passing the exam. These patterns, Reback suggests, may reflect differences in the subject-
specific strategies schools used to improve performance. When they are under pressure to 
raise math scores, they may well improve basic math instruction for all students, but 
when they are under pressure to improve reading scores, schools may tend to pull 
students out for individualized or small group instruction.  
                                                 
1
A study of accountability in England also finds adverse effects of accountability on the lowest performing 
students (Burgess et al., 2005). In contrast to the studies mentioned in the text, Burgess et al focus on 




Our research makes a three-fold contribution to this literature. First, in addition to 
testing the triage hypothesis suggested by some of the existing studies in the context of 
the status approach to accountability, we compare and contrast the distributional effects 
of the status and growth approaches to accountability. Second, following Reback, we 
compare distributional effects in both math and reading. Third, the fact that we are able to 
match the test scores of individual students as they progress through school means that 
we can use student fixed effects to control for the unmeasurable time-invariant 
characteristics of students, such as their ability or motivation, that might otherwise 
confound the analysis.  
In the following two sections, we first use a simplified model to predict the 
distributional effects of stylized versions of the two approaches to accountability and then 
describe the two programs that form the basis of our empirical work. In the following 
sections, we describe our data and results and end with a concluding discussion.  
Predicted Distributional Impacts of the Two Approaches  
We examine here the incentives faced by teachers (or other school personnel) in 
schools subject to each of the two forms of accountability. The status approach, as 
epitomized by NCLB, sets a target rate of proficiency, where the target is defined as the 
percentage of students in a particular school and grade level who are deemed proficient. 
The growth, or value-added approach, sets a target for the average rate growth of student 
achievement during the year. Under either system, school personnel in schools that reach 
the specified target in the particular system may receive rewards — financial or 
reputational or both — and those in schools that fail to reach the target are subject to 
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some form of penalty, whether in the form of naming and shaming, external intervention 
and loss of autonomy, or potential job loss.  
In the absence of either type of accountability pressure, we start with the 
following very simple achievement model:
2
  
(1)  Ait = Ait-1 + uit  
where Ait is the student’s achievement in year t normalized by the mean and standard 
deviation for all students in that grade in the state. Similarly Ait-1 is the student’s 
achievement in the prior year, also expressed as a normalized variable for that year and uit 
is a random error. Thus in the absence of an accountability system the student in this 
simple model is assumed to remain at the same point in the performance distribution as 
she was in the previous year, plus or minus a random error.  
 The Status Approach  
 With the introduction of a status-based accountability system in which students 
are expected to reach a specified proficiency standard, say PH in year t, students fall into 
two main categories — those with expected achievement in year t above the standard and 
those below (see figure 1). A school that does not expect to meet its overall school target 
rate without additional effort must decide how much additional effort to exert and on 
behalf of which students.  
Provided the school has a relatively large number of students — large enough so 
that the expected value of the random components of the performance of individual 
students is close to zero — the school has little or no incentive to invest additional effort 
                                                 
2
 This model is in the spirit of that presented in Neal and Schanzenbach (forthcoming) but differs by its 
explicit reference to prior year achievement rather than student ability. The use of prior year achievement 
makes the conceptual model consistent with our empirical specification discussed below.  
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in students for whom the expected level of Ait exceeds PH. For individual students for 
whom the expected level of Ait falls short of PH — that is, those students with a prior year 
test score below PH — the school has an incentive to invest up to the point at which the 
extra cost of the additional effort is just equal to the expected benefit to the school in 
terms of a reduced penalty. As emphasized by Neal and Schanzenbach (forthcoming), 
there could well be some students at the bottom of the expected performance distribution 
for whom the additional effort on the part of the school would simply be too costly 
relative to the benefits for the school to make the additional effort worthwhile. In that 
case, the school would focus its additional attention on the students expected to be below 
the proficiency level, but not so far below to make the standard out of reach.  
Two factors are particularly relevant for determining which students receive 
additional attention — and hence are likely to exhibit achievement gains — in the context 
of this accountability regime. The first is the level of the proficiency standard. The higher 
is the standard, the more likely it is that students at the bottom of the distribution will be 
too far below the standard to make it worthwhile for the school to exert greater effort on 
their behalf. Analogously, a lower proficiency standard, such as PL in figure 1, provides 
incentives for the school to focus attention on students in the lower part of the 
distribution, and the less likely it is that students at the bottom will be “left behind.” The 
second factor is the nature of the educational production function. The easier it is to raise 
student performance at the bottom of the distribution, perhaps through improved 
teaching, tutoring programs or grouping strategies, the greater is the incentive for the 
school to invest additional effort in students whose expected achievement is low relative 
to the standard. 
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Thus, the status model generates one clear distributional prediction. Students 
whose expected achievement is below the proficiency level will receive more attention — 
and hence should achieve at higher levels than they otherwise would have — than those 
above the proficiency level. Less clear is whether there will be a group of students at the 
very bottom who are left behind because of the high costs of raising them to the standard.  
Also not fully clear is what will happen to the achievement of students whose 
expected achievement slightly exceeds the proficiency standard. The presence of the error 
term in expression (1) means that the school has an incentive to devote some additional 
attention to students whose prior year achievement is slightly above the current year 
proficiency level; without additional attention, some of those students could well fall 
below the proficiency level. The more difficult it is for a school to predict how well its 
students will do, the more likely it is that the school will devote additional attention to 
students just above as well as to students below the proficiency standard.  
For students whose expected achievement is well above the proficiency standard, 
in contrast, the question becomes whether they will receive less attention — and hence 
will achieve at lower levels than they otherwise would have — in the presence of the 
accountability pressure. If additional effort for the students at the bottom is redistributed 
from students at the top, achievement of the higher performing students would fall. If the 
school is able to garner additional resources or find ways to use existing resources more 
effectively than in the absence of the accountability regime, any achievement gains at the 
bottom of the distribution need not come at the expense of those at the top. Thus, the 
impact of a status based accountability system on the high achieving students is an 
empirical question, which depends on how resources are used within the school.  
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The Growth Approach  
The incentives differ when accountability is based on the school’s average growth 
in student achievement. Once again, a school under pressure to improve has an incentive 
to invest additional effort on behalf of any individual student up to the point that the 
benefits of that investment in the form of penalties avoided are just equal to the costs of 
that investment. In this case, however, it is difficult to predict which students will benefit 
most because differential benefits depend on the relationship between additional effort 
and student achievement at different points of the achievement distribution.  
One possibility is that the additional effort needed to raise student achievement by 
a given amount is uniform across students defined by their prior-year achievement. In 
that case, a school under pressure to raise its average achievement growth has no 
incentive to invest any more in one group of students more than in another. Alternatively 
if additional effort generates greater gains for low-performing students than for high-
performing students — as might be the case, for example, if achievement is measured 
with a test with ceiling effects (that is, one in which the performance of high achieving 
students cannot be distinguished) — a growth-based accountability system would give 
schools an incentive to invest more in the students at the bottom of the distribution than at 
the top. A third possibility is that, consistent with the observation that students at the high 
end of the achievement distribution have made greater gains in the past than those at the 
bottom end, it may be easier for generate larger additional gains at the top of the 
distribution than at the bottom. In that case, schools under pressure would have an 
incentive to invest in the higher performing students, with concomitantly larger gains for 
that group than for those other groups.  
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Thus, how a growth based accountability system is likely to affect the distribution 
of achievement gains across students within schools is an empirical question. In general, 
the a priori prediction for large distributional effects is less compelling for a pure growth 
approach than for a status approach to accountability.  
Background on the two accountability programs in North Carolina  
 North Carolina is a good state in which to examine the distributional effects of 
these two types of accountability because its schools have been subject to the state’s 
growth-based accountability system since the academic year 1996/97 and the federal No 
Child Left Behind (NCLB) status-based accountability system since 2002/03. Because 
the two systems use different methods for judging the effectiveness of schools, some 
schools that appear to be performing well under one system may do poorly under the 
other.  In addition, in contrast to most other states, North Carolina has long used tests 
that are aligned with the state’s standard course of study, with test scores reported on a 
developmental scale. As a result, the tests measure what teachers are expected to teach 
and students to learn, and students in any grade are less likely to reach a ceiling test score 
than would be the case with a maximum score in each grade.  
The North Carolina ABCs Program 
The North Carolina accountability program — referred to as the ABCs program 
— was part of a broader state effort to improve the academic performance of the state’s 
children throughout the 1990s. First implemented in 1996-97, the ABCs program was 
intended to hold teachers in individual schools accountable for the overall performance of 
their students. Though the program applies to high schools as well, the present study 
15 
 
focuses solely on schools serving students in grades three through eight. Of particular 
importance for this study, under the ABCs program schools are judged primarily on the 
annual achievement gains of their students from one year to the next. This growth 
approach to accountability was feasible because the state had been testing all students in 
grades three through eight annually in math and reading since the early 1990s — long 
before it was required to do so under the Federal No Child Left Behind legislation of 
2001.  
From 1996/97 to 2005, an expected average gain in test scores was predicted for 
each student, and the school was deemed effective or not depending on how the actual 
gains of its students compare to their predicted gains.
3
 If a school raised student 
achievement by more than was predicted for that school, all the school’s teachers 
received financial bonuses — $1500 for achieving high growth and $750 for meeting 
expected achievement growth. Schools that did not achieve their expected growth were 
publicly identified and in some cases subject to intervention from the state. The intent of 
the program was to induce each school to provide its students with a year’s worth of 
learning for a year’s worth of education. In 2005, the formula for calculating growth was 
                                                 
3
 The expected average gains are predicted as follows. For each grade and subject (i.e. math and reading), a 
student’s expected score is based on an equation of the form TSt - TSt-1 = a + bX1 + cX2 where TSt is the 
test score in either math or reading in year t and TSt-1 the test score in the same subject in year t-1, X1 is a 
proxy for the student’s proficiency and is measured as the sum of the student’s math and reading scores for 
the previous year minus the state average, and X2 is designed to account for regression to the mean and is 
measured as the student’s prior year score in the subject of interest minus the state average in that subject. 
The tests are scored on a developmental scale and the parameter “a” can be interpreted as the statewide 
average gain in score for students in the specified grade and for the specified subject. The parameters a, b, 
and c were estimated using 1994 test scores for each grade. Because the b and c coefficients were quite 
similar across grades for each subject area, the state uses a single pair of b and c coefficients for each 
subject area to determine the expected growth rates. For further discussion see Ladd and Walsh (2002).  
16 
 




In addition to their growth rankings, schools also receive various designations, 
such as schools of excellence, schools of distinction, and priority schools, based on the 
percentages of students meeting grade level standards, which carry with them no 
financial bonuses. In addition, some schools are labeled “low performing” based on their 
high failure rates as well as their poor growth performance. Thus the ABCs program does 
not completely ignore achievement status. At the same time, the teachers’ bonuses are 
based solely on the growth in student achievement. The existence of positive incentives 
does not alter the predictions of the simple model presented above. A school’s failure to 
meet its growth standard still imposes costs on its teachers; the cost is simply the bonuses 
foregone.  
No Child Left Behind (NCLB)  
The federal government started holding schools accountable for student 
achievement with the 2001 reauthorization of the federal Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act, called No Child Left Behind. This law applied to schools in North 
Carolina and elsewhere starting in the 2002/03 academic year. NCLB requires states to 
test students annually in reading and mathematics in grades 3-8, and assesses schools on 
the basis of whether their students are making adequately yearly progress (AYP) toward 
the ultimate goal of 100 percent proficiency by 2014. Moreover, each school must meet 
                                                 
4
 The new formula no longer is based on changes in students’ developmental scale scores from one year to 
the next. Instead, it is based on changes test scores normalized based on the mean and standard deviation 
from the first year a particular test was used in the state. The academic change for an individual student is 
now calculated as the student’s actual normalized score minus the average of two prior year academic 
scores, with the average discounted to account for reversion to the mean.  
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annual proficiency targets not only for the student body as a whole, but also for various 
subgroups defined by race, socio-economic status, and disability within the school. 
Failure to meet AYP brings with it consequences, such as the right of children to move to 
another school and the requirement that districts use their federal Title 1 grants to pay for 
supplemental services, including those from private providers. After five years of failure, 
the school is subject to state takeover by the state, an outcome that, to date, has been rare 
across the country, and is not directly relevant for this study which ends in 2007.  
Under NCLB, North Carolina policy makers must set annual proficiency targets 
— defined in terms of the percentages of students who are at grade level — that will 
assure that each school is on target toward the 2013/14 goal of 100 percent proficiency. 
The result is that under the federal law each school faces an annual target defined in 
terms of achievement status rather than in terms of achievement growth as under the state 
accountability system. Not surprisingly, a school that performs well under the state’s 
accountability system may do poorly under the federal system, and vice versa.  
Table 1 shows accountability outcomes for all North Carolina elementary and 
middle schools by year for the period 1997 to 2007. In the first year of NCLB, 44 percent 
of schools failed AYP, but met the state’s growth standard, and only 4 percent of schools 
failed both AYP and the state’s growth standard. After this anomalous year, the 
disparities were less dramatic, but in no year did the two programs identify precisely the 
same schools as below accountability standards. For example, in the most recent 
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available year, 2007, 32.6 percent of schools failed AYP (only) and an additional 23.8 
percent failed both AYP and the state’s growth standard.
5
  
The bottom line is that for the past 11 years, schools in North Carolina have been 
facing pressure to raise student achievement from one or both of these accountability 
systems. How each of the two approaches has affected students at different points in the 
prior year achievement distribution is the subject of the following sections.  
 
Data and Methods  
We start with data on all students in North Carolina public schools in grades 3-8 
from 1996/97 to 2006/07 for whom test scores are available in either math or reading.
6
 
The total panel data set includes more than 6.8 million student-year observations, with 
more than 1.9 million unique students and 2,129 unique elementary and middle schools. 
Because we are interested in changes in student test scores from one year to the next, our 
models are based on the approximately 4.7 million student-year observations for which 
we have test score data and lagged school covariates for at least two consecutive years. 
Figure 2 depicts the distribution of students by the number of years each appears in the 
                                                 
5
 More recently, North Carolina and several other states have been provided a waiver under NCLB to 
incorporate some elements of the growth model into the federal accountability standards. Under that 
provision, some students who are on track to meet the proficiency standard within three years now 
contribute to a school’s progress toward the goal. Because the growth is still evaluated in terms of progress 
toward the absolute standard rather than in relation to a predicted growth standard, however, the system 
remains essentially a status model, rather than a growth model. 
6
 These data are available through the North Carolina Education Research Data Center, housed at Duke 
University. To protect the confidentiality of the data, the data center replaced all the original student 
identifiers with new unique identifiers that allowed us to match student test scores by student over time.  
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mathematics analysis sample used to compute mathematics achievement gain.
7
 About 31 
percent of students have six test scores, one for each grade level covered in the study 
(grades 3-8). The two percent of students with more than six scores reflects the fact that 
students who were held back take a test more than once.  
Test scores—The fact that North Carolina reports test scores on a developmental 
scale helps address, but does not fully mitigate, the comparability problems that arise 
from the different tests as students progress through school. In particular, the periodic 
rescaling of tests makes it difficult to compare scores from, say, a fifth grade math test 
taken in one year with a fifth grade math test taken in a different year.
8
 To make them 
comparable both across grades and over time, we standardized all scale scores by subject, 
grade level and year. As a result, our estimates refer to differences in the relative position 
of students in the achievement distribution across years, rather than absolute changes. For 
the two subjects, math and reading, we define the two variables as follows: 
Stdmath = the standardized test score in math 
Stdread = the standardized test sore in reading 
Accountability pressure—To capture the accountability pressures from the two 
programs, we define the following three school-level indicator variables and treat schools 
that made both AYP and Growth as the baseline category:  
FailAYP = 1 if the school failed to make AYP, and 0 otherwise, 
FailGrowth = 1 if the school failed to make its expected growth, and 0 otherwise,  
                                                 
7
 The histogram is based on the estimation sample from model 1 of Table 2. N=4,533,651. Number of 
unique students: 1,448,258. A histogram for reading achievement gain looks virtually the same and is 
available from the authors upon request.  
8
 The state rescaled the reading tests in 2003 and the math tests in both 2001 and 2006.  
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FailBoth = 1 if the school failed both AYP and expected growth, and 0 otherwise.  
Because NCLB did not exist prior to 2002/03, FailAYP is coded 0 for all schools 
prior to that year. As shown in table 1, across the post-NCLB years the percentages of 
elementary and middle schools not meeting AYP ranged from a low of 26 in 2004 to a 
high of 56 in 2007. The variation in the growth failure rate across years is even greater, in 
part because of an anomalous outcome in 2003. Due to changes in the state assessments 
in 2003, only five percent of the schools failed to make their expected growth in that year 
compared to 27 and 29 percent in the prior and the following years, respectively. The 
highest failure rate over the entire period was 43 percent in 1997; as of 2007, it was about 
28 percent. Figure 3 illustrates the variation over time in the percentages of schools 
subject to accountability pressure as measured by these two variables. Not shown in the 
figure (but shown in table 1) are the proportions of schools that failed both standards. 
This percentage ranged from a low in 2003 of four percent to a high of 31 percent in 
2006.  
Distributional variables—Given our primary focus on the distributional effects of 
accountability, we have defined two sets of binary variables to describe a student’s 
position in the prior year test score distributions in math and reading. We define a series 
of indicator variables for students below and above the proficiency level, with the 
category of 0 to 0.5 standard deviations (SD) above the proficiency level as the baseline 
category. The relevant reference point is the cut score for grade level performance 
because North Carolina policy makers have defined proficiency for the purposes of 
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NCLB as being at grade level.
9
 We use seven indicators variables, defined in terms of 0.5 
standard deviation increments, with four below the base category, and three above. Thus, 
we define the following two vectors of variables for math or reading:  
LowMath (or Reading) = a vector with four elements denoting distance below 
grade level (below 1.5 SD, 1-1.5 SD below, .5-1 SD below, and 0-.5 SD below).  
HighMath (or Reading)= a vector with three elements denoting distance above 
grade level (above 1.5 SD, 1-1.5 SD above, and .5-1 SD above).  
Interaction terms—Of most interest for this study is how accountability pressure 
affects the distribution of test scores within the schools feeling that pressure. To capture 
these distributional effects, we define for each subject vectors of interaction terms 
between place in the achievement distribution and the type of accountability pressure:  
FailAYP*LowMath (or Reading)  
FailAYP*HighMath (or Reading)  
FailGrowth*LowMath (or Reading)  
FailGrowth*HighMath (or Readng)  
FailBoth*LowMath (or Reading)  
FailBoth*HighMath (or Readng)  
This flexible specification permits us to examine directly any nonlinearities in the 
distributional effects, and in particular to look for evidence of educational triage, in the 
schools facing three types of accountability pressure: 1) pressure from the status model 
only, 2) pressure from the growth model only, and 3) pressure from both status and 
growth models.  
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 This North Carolina standard of proficiency corresponds roughly to the “Basic” level of performance on 




Following standard practice in the modeling of student achievement, we begin 
with the following value-added model of the distributional effects of accountability 
pressure (here denoted by a generic accountability pressure term, AP):  
 
where Achijt is the student’s achievement in reading or math in the current year; Achijt-1 is 
the student’s achievement in the prior year; APjt-1 is school j’s accountability status vector 
from the prior year; the vectors Lowijt-1 and Highijt-1 denote the student’s position in the 
prior test score distribution; Xijt is a vector of student control variables such as gender, 
race and poverty status; Sijt is a vector of school control variables; and uijt is an error term.  
A number of statistical issues arise in the estimation of this model. First, although 
this value-added specification is quite common in the literature, including the lagged 
dependent variable on the right hand side may bias the estimated coefficients because of 
its correlation with the error term (Todd & Wolpin, 2003). Yet controlling for prior 
achievement is a useful way to account for the cumulative nature of the education process 
because it controls for the learning that the student brings to the classroom in year t. Its 
coefficient, β8, is expected to be less than 1 (usually between 0.6 to 0.8) because there is 
likely to be some decay of knowledge from one year to the next (Clotfelter et al., 2007). 
To eliminate problems associated with using a lagged dependent variable as a predictor, 
some researchers move the lagged term to the left hand side of the equation and estimate 
a gain-score model in which the dependent variable is the change in test score (Achijt - 
Achijt-1) from one year to the next. If the assumptions underlying the original model are 
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correct, however, the gains model is misspecified in that it forces the coefficient of the 
prior year test score to be 1. So instead of using a gain-score specification in this study 
we present results from two models: the value added specification in equation two, 
above, and a levels specification, which is identical except that it excludes the lagged 
achievement variable and hence avoids the bias associated with that variable. The levels 
model is reasonable in this context because, as we explain next, we also include student 
fixed effects.  
A second threat to the validity of the model is the problem of negative selection of 
students into schools facing accountability pressure, which would downwardly bias the 
main effects of accountability pressure and the interaction terms associated with them. 
Because accountability pressure is not randomly distributed among schools, one might 
expect, for example, that achievement levels in year t would be lower in the schools 
designated as failing in the prior year than in other schools. The concern here is primarily 
one of adverse (or negative) student selection, namely that the students with low test 
scores or low expected gains in test scores may be overrepresented in the schools 
designated as not meeting performance or growth standards. One way to address this 
problem is to include in the equation as part of the X vector a sufficiently large number of 
student-specific characteristics that the remaining correlation between the error term and 
the school level accountability variables is kept to a minimum. Such variables might 
include, for example, the race of the student, characteristics of the student’s family such 
as their income and education levels, and special characteristics of the students such as 
their participation in programs for gifted students or for students with special education 
needs. Even rich student level data, however, are unlikely to fully solve the problem 
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because some of the relevant student characteristics, such as ability and motivation, are 
typically unobserved.  
Longitudinal data permits a reasonable solution to this problem. Because we have 
observations on multiple test scores in each subject for each student, we can include 
student fixed effects These fixed effects control for all the time-invariant characteristics 
of students, both those that otherwise might have been measurable and those that are not. 
Along with the student fixed effects, we also include student-level variables that change 
over time. Among these variables are participation in special education programs of 
various types, and whether the student is new to the school in the particular year. Such a 
strategy is not without a cost; it means that any effects of accountability pressure are 
identified not by all students in the sample but rather by those who have at least two 
consecutive test scores and whose schools’ accountability status changes from year to 
year.  
An additional statistical problem is mean reversion, which if unaddressed would 
distort our estimates of distributional effects. Most likely, some students who performed 
well below grade level in a particular year did so not because of low true achievement but 
because random factors, such as a bad night’s sleep or a headache, reduced their score. 
Such students are likely to have larger test score gains than other students due to 
regression to the mean. The converse is true for some students who performed well above 
grade level in a particular year; such students would have smaller gains than other 
students due to mean reversion. In sum, this bias would lead to a negative relationship 
between prior achievement and the following year’s test score gain. To reduce bias from 
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mean reversion, we define each student’s position in the prior year achievement 
distribution using his or her performance in the other subject. In other words, in the 
models explaining math achievement, we place students in the prior year distribution 
based on reading scores rather than math scores, and vice versa. The underlying 
assumption is that a student’s position in the distribution of one subject is highly 
correlated with position in the other subject, which is reasonable given that reading and 
math test scores are highly correlated in this sample (r=.73 to .78 depending on the grade 
level and year). Also underlying this approach is the assumption that the measurement 
error in math is uncorrelated with the measurement error in reading, an assumption that is 
not fully satisfied in our data.
10
 Nonetheless, we believe this approach goes a long way to 
minimizing the impact of mean reversion, a conclusion that is supported by the patterns 
we report below.  
The final threat to validity is the possibility that school-level confounders, such as 
concentrations of low-performing students, could bias the estimates of the accountability 
pressure and distributional effects. For this reason, we control for the concentration of 
minorities, limited English proficient students, and a measure of the diversity of the 
student population, the number of numerically accountable subgroups according the 
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 To test whether measurement error was correlated across reading and math scores, for each subject we 
computed the three-year average of lagged score, current score, and next year’s score and deviated the 
current year’s score from this average to compute the error from the three-year average. The reading and 






 Preliminary analysis indicates that schools with large numbers of 
accountable subgroups are much more likely to fail AYP than less diverse schools.  
In sum, we present student fixed effects models that adjust for mean reversion, 
include time varying student covariates and school-level controls for minority 
composition and diversity, and report results from both value added models and levels 
models.  
Complete model  
The complete value added model for math takes the following form (with a 
comparable model for reading):  
 
where the dependent variable is the standardized math score and the one-year lagged 
standardized math score is included as a covariate. The accountability pressure variables, 
FailAYP, FailGrowth, and FailBoth, indicate the type of pressure facing the school in the 
prior year. The levels model is identical except for the exclusion of the lagged dependent 
variable.  
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 NCLB regulations define nine accountable subgroups (white, black, Hispanic, Native American, Asian, 
Multiracial, economically disadvantaged, limited English proficient, students with disabilities). In North 
Carolina, a school must have at least 40 students to be held accountable in AYP calculations. Because 
student free/reduced priced lunch status was unavailable for 2007, we are unable to compute and control for 
the fraction of the student population which receives free or reduced priced lunches.  
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All positional vectors and accountability pressure variables are entered with a 
one-year lag because school ratings are released in the Spring and Summer prior to the 
target school year. Of particular interest are the coefficient vectors β6- β11 which represent 
the distributional effects of the accountability system in the schools facing accountability 
pressure. As noted above, X is a vector of time-varying student characteristics and S is a 
vector of time-varying school characteristics. The vectors γt and δi represent year fixed 
effects and student fixed effects, respectively. The final term is the error term. We have 
included year effects to control for any year-specific effects on achievement.
12
  
The descriptive information in table 2 shows that on average only 22 and 19 
percent of students in reading and math, respectively, were below grade level between 
1997 and 2007, a finding consistent with that the observation that North Carolina’s 
proficiency level is set at a relatively low level.
13
 The valid N for the achievement 
positional indicators are lower than for other variables because they are entered in lagged 
form and the prior year test score for a student’s first test is missing by definition. On 
average over the period 1997 to 2006, 22% of students attended a school that failed AYP, 
32% attended a school that failed the growth standard and 10% attended a school that 
                                                 
12 Estimating this model using fixed effects to transform this equation to a within-child estimator of the 
effect of within-child deviations from student means on the outcome and covariates produces consistent 
results which adjust for the negative selection of students into low achieving schools under the following 
assumptions (Todd & Wolpin, 2003): 1) The effect of student fixed characteristics such as ability is 
independent of age; 2) Future school choices are invariant to prior achievement outcomes; and 3) The 
effect of school inputs are independent of age. We plan to explore the tenability of these assumptions in 
future work.  
13
 Comparing results from the state assessment to NAEP scores is one way to determine the relative rigor of 
North Carolina’s proficiency levels. On NAEP in 2007, 34% of 8
th
 graders were at or above proficient in 
math and 28% were at or above proficient in reading. On the NC state assessments in 2007, 63% of 8
th
 





 The sample is 30% black, five percent Hispanic, five percent 
Other (Asian and American Indian), and 46% received a free or subsidized lunch (not 
shown).  
Results  
Table three reports both the main effects and the distributional effects of 
accountability pressure for the period 1998-2007. Because the dependent variables are 
standardized by grade level and year, the regression coefficients represent the effect of 
being in a particular category relative to the base category on the student’s test scores, as 
measured in terms of fractions of a standard deviation. The levels specification estimates 
the change in student achievement relative to students’ own average achievement, as 
captured by the student fixed effects. The value-added fixed effects specification 
estimates the change in student achievement relative to the student’s own average 
achievement, controlling for the students’ lagged achievement. We use the shorthand of 
test score gain to describe changes in outcomes for estimates from either model.  
Because of the interaction terms in the model, the coefficients of the 
accountability pressure variables indicate the average relationship between students’ 
current year test scores and being in a school facing accountability pressure compared to 
being in a school not facing accountability pressure only for students with prior year test 
scores in the base category, namely between the grade level cut score and ½ standard 
deviation above it. The effects on students elsewhere in the prior achievement 
distribution can be derived from these main effects of accountability pressure combined 
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 During the period 2003 to 2006, 50% of students attended a school that failed AYP, 42% attended a 
school that failed the growth standard, and 29% attended a school that failed both standards.  
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with the coefficients of the interaction terms. Analogously, the coefficients on the prior 
achievement variables indicate the relationship between students’ current test scores and 
being low or high in the distribution of the prior year test scores relative to being near the 
grade level cut score only for students in schools not facing accountability pressure.  
The first row in table 3 indicates that students in the base, or reference category, 
in schools facing pressure from failing the growth standard alone exhibit lower student 
achievement in subsequent years in both math and reading than comparable students in 
schools not facing such pressure, with the negative coefficients being larger in math than 
in reading. Although it might be tempting to interpret these negative coefficients as 
evidence that an accountability system based on a growth approach reduces overall 
student achievement, that interpretation would not be correct. In fact it is not possible to 
determine the overall effects of the accountability system from this type of analysis. The 
most we can do is to identify results for one type of school relative to another. Hence, the 
negative coefficients of the failed growth variables simply indicate that students in the 
reference category in schools that meet growth targets — that is, schools that generate 
bonuses for teachers — attain higher test score growth in the subsequent year than do 
students in schools failing to meet their growth targets. 
Facing pressure under the AYP, or status, standard alone is associated with higher 
student achievement in subsequent years in reading, and lower achievement in math, 
though only the negative coefficient in model two is significant. Students in schools 
facing pressure from both AYP and the state’s growth standard perform somewhat less 
well in subsequent years in reading and roughly the same in subsequent years in math 
(coefficients are negative but not distinguishable from zero).  
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The next set of variables — the achievement indicators — yield the distributional 
patterns for students in schools facing no negative accountability pressure. The 
coefficients indicate that initial status is reinforced as students progress through such 
schools. In other words, lower achieving students tend to have lower gains relative to 
students closer to grade level. Higher achieving students tend to have higher test score 
gains relative to students closer to grade level. For example, column one indicates that 
students in the lowest category of the prior performance distribution exhibit subsequent 
math scores that are 0.05 SD below a student who performs at grade level. The same 
model indicates that students in the highest category of the prior year distribution exhibit 
test scores that are 0.06 SD above those of students who performs at grade level. This 
pattern holds in both reading and math, with the value added coefficients (models two 
and four) being slightly larger than the levels coefficients (models one and three). Figure 
4 plots the coefficients for each of the four models. The key point is that the lines all are 
sloping upward, a finding that suggests that we have successfully countered much, if not 
all, of any bias related to regression to the mean.  
Of most interest are the coefficients of the interaction terms. As shown in the next 
three panels of the table and figures 5-7, the differential distributional effects in schools 
facing accountability pressure follow a very different pattern from those shown in figure 
4. All these estimates represent differences in outcomes relative to what would have 
happened in the absence of the negative pressure of the specific accountability system, 
that is relative to the patterns displayed in figure 4.  
In schools failing only the growth standard, students with low prior achievement 
tend to gain more in math than students with middle and high prior achievement (see 
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figure 5). Students with the lowest levels of prior achievement (below 1.5 SD below 
grade level) exhibit the largest gains, with the point estimates declining monotonically as 
the prior-year achievement category approaches the grade level cut point. Among high 
achievers, only students in the very top tail gain slightly relative to students just above 
grade level. This pattern suggests that in response to a growth standard of accountability, 
schools apparently find it easier to raise test scores at the bottom and at the very top 
relative to students at grade level, and do not focus additional attention on students close 
to the proficiency standard. In reading, little or no evidence emerges of significant 
distributional effects associated with pressure from the state’s program alone, although 
slightly higher reading gains do emerge for high achieving students.
15
  
With respect to status pressure, the table shows that schools failing only AYP 
generate positive gains in both math and reading among low performing students but 
negative effects in reading among high achieving students (see figure 6). The pattern at 
the bottom of the distribution is fully consistent with the prediction that under a status 
approach to accountability, schools facing pressure to raise student achievement to the 
proficiency standard would focus attention on students below it. The large negative 
effects in reading at the high end of the distribution indicate that the gains at the bottom 
in that subject have come at the expense of higher achieving students in the affected 
schools, a finding that echoes Reback’s (2008) analysis of accountability in Texas 
described above. In summary, for math AYP pressure is associated with test score gains 
for low achieving students, with no test score losses for high achieving students, while in 
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 Restricting the analysis to the pre NCLB period (1997-2002) does not alter the patterns. The 
distributional patterns of growth based accountability are similar to those in Table 3, albeit with slightly 
larger coefficients for the low-performing students. Results are available from authors upon request.  
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reading AYP pressure is associated with test score gains for low achieving students and 
rather large test score losses for high achieving students.  
Schools failing both AYP and the state’s growth standard tend to exhibit positive 
gains in math for low achieving students in the bottom tail (below one SD below grade 
level) as well as negative effects in that subject among high achieving students (see figure 
7). In reading no statistically significant distributional effects emerge from such schools, 
except for in the top tail (more than 1.5 SD above grade level) where students gain 
slightly relative to middle and low achieving students.  
In summary, accountability pressures appear to offset at least to some extent the 
distributional patterns that favor high achievement students in schools not facing negative 
accountability patterns. Rather than reinforcing initial status, accountability pressure from 
either the federal status-based program alone or the state growth-based program, alone is 
associated with test score gains for low achieving students in both math and reading, with 
the effects stronger and more consistently statistically significant for math than for 
reading. Only in reading and only in response to status pressure do the gains at the 
bottom come at the expense of students with high prior year test scores. We speculate that 
the strikingly different patterns for math and reading under status based accountability 
reflects the particular challenges that schools face in raising student achievement in 
reading relative to math given the differentially important contribution of family 
background to reading achievement. Efforts to raise reading scores among the low 
performers apparently come not from improved instructional approaches that benefit all 
students but rather from shifts of resources from one group to another.  
33 
 
The distributional patterns for schools facing both kinds of accountability pressure 
are somewhat harder to explain. Consistent with the view that it is difficult for schools to 
raise reading scores, we find no evidence that such schools succeed in raising reading 
scores more at the bottom end of the distribution relative to the middle and upper ends. 
Somewhat inconsistent with our speculations in the previous paragraph, however, is that 
the gains in math at the bottom end appear to come at the expense of the students at the 
higher end of the distribution in such schools. Our only explanation is that such schools 
are under such pressure to raise student achievement that even in math, they do so by 
shifting resources from the higher performing to the lower performing students. 
Aggregate Achievement Tradeoffs 
The analysis to this point focuses on average achievement effects of 
accountability pressure by prior achievement category. Table 4 compares the weighted 
gains or losses to students below grade level to the weighted gains or losses to those 
above grade level and highlights the nature of the distributional tradeoffs that emerge 
from the two accountability regimes. The entries in the table are the coefficients of the 
interaction terms from table 3 weighted by the estimation sample proportion of students 
in each category and summed for the categories above and below grade level.
16
 Because 
only about 25 percent of the students in schools facing growth pressure were below grade 
level (based on the prior year achievement distribution) during the study period, in 
contrast to about 75 percent above grade level, all the entries for low achieving students 
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 The aggregate weighted coefficient for the below category is , where k indexes prior 
achievement categories and pk is the proportion of students in category k. The aggregated weighted 
coefficient for the above category is . 
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are far smaller (in absolute value) relative to the entries for high achieving students than 
would be suggested by the relevant coefficients in table 3.  
In schools facing growth pressure alone, the combined results for math and 
reading (see top panel in the final two columns) indicate that both low and high achieving 
students gain relative to those just above grade level, with the test score gains to students 
above grade level being somewhat larger than for those below. In math, the gains for 
those above grade level are approximately equal to the gains for those below grade level, 
while in reading the gains for those above grade level far exceed those for students below 
grade level.  
A very different pattern emerges for schools facing status pressure. In schools 
facing status pressure alone, the combined math and reading test score gains of students 
below grade level are more than offset by the test score losses to students above grade 
level (see final two columns of the second panel). Depending on the model specification 
(levels versus value added), the test score losses among high achievers are between 2.4 
and 2.9 times the gains among low achievers. Combining math and reading, however, 
masks the differences between the two subjects noted earlier. In math, no tradeoff 
emerges between gains at the bottom versus losses at the top. In reading, in contrast, 
gains for students below grade level are negligible compared to the far larger test score 
losses among those above grade level. Similarly, in schools facing both growth and status 
pressure, the combined results indicate that students below grade level gain essentially 
nothing, while the test scores of students above grade level fall. Hence the patterns in 
these schools are more similar to those from schools facing status pressure than to those 
from schools facing growth pressure.  
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Thus, we conclude that the distributional effects clearly differ between the two 
types of accountability regimes. Though the achievement results are quite similar for 
students below grade level, the results differ quite substantively for students above grade 
level. Schools under pressure to meet the state’s growth standard were apparently able to 
raise achievement at the bottom of the distribution without reducing it at the top. That 
was not the case for schools under pressure from the NCLB type status pressure, where 
students at the top of the distribution, especially in reading, were harmed relative to those 
at the middle and the bottom of the distribution.  
Conclusion 
Many educational policy makers currently view school accountability as a crucial 
component of any school reform strategy. As a result, holding educators accountable for 
student learning is now a part of all state and federal educational policy. There are two 
main metrics for holding educators responsible for student learning at the school level: 
status, which measures average achievement or percent of students at grade level, and 
growth, which measures the average achievement growth of students during the year. In 
this study, we compare and contrast how these two types of accountability pressure affect 
student achievement at different points in the achievement distribution in the schools 
under the most pressure to raise achievement. We conduct the study in North Carolina 
where schools have been subject to both types of accountability.  
Using a ten-year panel dataset and fixed effects models of student achievement 
gains in reading and math we find that neither type of school-based accountability system 
generates distributionally neutral effects on student achievement in the schools subject to 
accountability pressure. Moreover, the distributional effects differ depending on whether 
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the system holds schools accountable for the growth or the status of their students’ 
learning. This first conclusion should not be surprising. It simply reflects the fact that 
educators do indeed respond to incentives, and that the incentives to pay attention to 
students at different points of the achievement distribution differ between the two 
approaches. The policy challenge is to design a system consistent with the goals of the 
policy.  
Second, we find that under both approaches to accountability, the average gain to 
a student below the proficiency standard is larger than to a student at or above the 
standard. Nonetheless, in the case of the growth approach, the overall distributional effect 
is to raise student achievement in the aggregate slightly more at the high end of the 
distribution than at the low end relative to the students in the reference category. This 
outcome occurs because of the far larger number of students above grade level than 
below in the relevant schools. How to evaluate this aggregate distributional pattern 
depends on the goal of the accountability program. It could represent a shortcoming if the 
main goal of the program were to close achievement gaps. No such concern arises if the 
main goal is to raise student achievement throughout the achievement distribution within 
the low-performing schools; the patterns simply indicate the empirical fact that schools 
do so by raising achievement at both ends of the distribution. 
Third, perhaps the most striking finding to emerge from this study is that status 
based accountability pressure generates large adverse effects for students above the 
proficiency threshold in reading. No such negative effects emerge with respect to the 
growth approach. One possible explanation for the differentially adverse effects in 
reading relative to math is that schools may try to improve reading scores of low 
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performers by using student-specific strategies that reduce resources available to other 
students while in math they may use more general strategies, including better instruction 
for all students. Whether the gains to students below proficiency are worth the costs to 
students above proficiency is a question of values. If policy makers place equal value on 
effects at different points of the prior year achievement distribution, the net distributional 
effects of the program would clearly be negative. Based on the results combined for math 
and reading in table 5, the net distributional effects of the status based accountability 
program would be positive only if policy makers weighted the gains to low achievers 2-3 
times as much as the costs to high achievers.  
Fourth, we find little or no evidence of educational triage in connection with 
either approach to accountability. In particular, under both types of accountability in 
North Carolina, even students at the very bottom of the achievement distribution in 
schools facing accountability pressure experience positive achievement gains on average 
relative to students at or above grade level. This finding contrasts with much, but not all, 
of the prior literature that examines how schools respond to status based accountability 
systems. One possible explanation for the difference is North Carolina’s relatively low 
proficiency standard. It may well be that in this state, raising students up to the 
proficiency standard is more feasible than in other states with higher standards.  
Because this study is specifically designed to focus on the distributional effects of 
the two types of accountability in schools facing negative accountability pressure, we are 
not able to make any statements about the overall or average achievement effects of 
either type of program. Measuring overall effects would require a completely different 
type of study design, such as those used in the cross-state studies described earlier. 
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Moreover, we cannot say anything about a variety of other policy relevant considerations 
that arise with school-based accountability systems, such as the potential narrowing of 
the curriculum and the tendency for schools to respond to accountability pressure by 
moving students into special education programs.  
Nonetheless, we believe the distributional patterns highlighted in this study 
should play a central role in policy debates about school accountability. School based 
accountability is motivated at least in part by a desire to narrow achievement gaps by 
raising the performance of students at the bottom of the achievement distribution relative 
to those at the top. It operates, however, by putting more pressure on some schools 
relative to others, rather than by placing pressure directly on students. There would be no 
within-school distributional effects if schools responded to accountability pressure by 
improving outcomes equally for all students. In fact, however, this study shows that 
schools facing pressure to improve apparently focus more attention on some students than 
on others, and that the distributional patterns differ both by the type of accountability 
system and by subject. To the extent that positive distributional effects emerge for 
students at the bottom of the distribution in the affected schools, with no adverse effects 
on higher performing students in those schools, an accountability system has the potential 
to close test score gaps in ways that may be deemed desirable by most observers. To the 
extent that it raises achievement for some students, but lowers it for others, as in the case 
for reading in status-based accountability system, in contrast, there are clear tradeoffs that 
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Percentage Distribution of Number of Years a Student Appears in the Analysis Sample
Note: Based on the estimation sample from model 1 of Table 3. N=4,478,689. Number of unique students: 1,434,032. 
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Fig. 6 Distributional Effects in Schools Facing Status Pressure
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Position Relative to Grade Level (std deviations)
Distributional Effects in Schools Facing Both Kinds of Pressure


























1997 315,865 0 246,600 0 562,465 902 0 682 0 1,584
56.16 0 43.84 0 100 56.94 0 43.06 0 100
1998 485,733 0 90,867 0 576,600 1,358 0 275 0 1,633
84.24 0 15.76 0 100 83.16 0 16.84 0 100
1999 487,393 0 102,163 0 589,556 1,292 0 346 0 1,638
82.67 0 17.33 0 100 78.88 0 21.12 0 100
2000 396,488 0 208,994 0 605,482 1,141 0 562 0 1,703
65.48 0 34.52 0 100 67 0 33 0 100
2001 350,187 0 272,029 0 622,216 1,068 0 718 0 1,786
56.28 0 43.72 0 100 59.8 0 40.2 0 100
2002 445,296 0 183,196 0 628,492 1,266 0 477 0 1,743
70.85 0 29.15 0 100 72.63 0 27.37 0 100
2003 239,361 349,308 5,737 42,235 636,641 909 814 17 73 1,813
37.6 54.87 0.9 6.63 100 50.14 44.9 0.94 4.03 100
2004 295,833 80,484 104,273 159,555 640,145 1,077 218 276 264 1,835
46.21 12.57 16.29 24.92 100 58.69 11.88 15.04 14.39 100
2005 252,807 132,325 77,127 180,475 642,734 857 332 265 391 1,845
39.33 20.59 12 28.08 100 46.45 17.99 14.36 21.19 100
2006 157,980 191,989 57,904 222,002 629,875 572 444 261 584 1,861
25.08 30.48 9.19 35.25 100 30.74 23.86 14.02 31.38 100
2007 205,930 278,253 19,383 151,352 654,918 728 611 91 446 1,876
31.44 42.49 2.96 23.11 100 38.81 32.57 4.85 23.77 100
Total 3,632,873 1,032,359 1,368,273 755,619 6,789,124 11,170 2,419 3,970 1,758 19,317
53.51 15.21 20.15 11.13 100 57.82 12.52 20.55 9.1 100
Table 1. Number and Percent of Students and Schools by School Accountability Status and Year








stdmath Standardized math test score 6.59 0 1
stdread Standardized reading test score 6.56 0 1
Accountability Pressure 
Variables (Lagged 1 notayp School failed AYP std 6.14 0.219 0.414
notgrow School failed growth std 6.12 0.317 0.465
notboth School failed both AYP and growth std 6.14 0.096 0.295
Prior Achievement 
Indicator Variables lr4 Less than -1.5 SD below grade level in reading 4.70 0.020 0.139
lr3 -1.5 to -1.0 SD below grade level in reading 4.70 0.037 0.188
lr2 -1.0 to -0.5 SD below grade level in reading 4.70 0.059 0.236
lr1 -0.5 to 0 SD below grade level in reading 4.70 0.097 0.296
hr2 0.5 to 1.0 SD above grade level in reading 4.70 0.195 0.396
hr3 1.0 to 1.5 SD above grade level in reading 4.70 0.184 0.387
hr4 More than 1.5 SD above grade level in reading 4.70 0.265 0.441
lm4 Less than -1.5 SD below grade level in math 4.71 0.008 0.090
lm3 -1.5 to -1.0 SD below grade level in math 4.71 0.024 0.154
lm2 -1.0 to -0.5 SD below grade level in math 4.71 0.055 0.228
lm1 -0.5 to 0 SD below grade level in math 4.71 0.100 0.300
hm2 0.5 to 1.0 SD above grade level in math 4.71 0.180 0.384
hm3 1.0 to 1.5 SD above grade level in math 4.71 0.175 0.380
hm4 More than 1.5 SD above grade level in math 4.71 0.309 0.462
Student Background 
Characteristicsgifted Student was designated gifted 6.82 0.131 0.338
specialed Student received special education services 6.72 0.138 0.345
currentlylep Student showed Limited English Proficiency 6.82 0.022 0.148
newtoschool Student was new to the school 5.23 0.353 0.478
black Black student 6.80 0.298 0.457
hisp Hispanic student 6.80 0.055 0.228
other Other racial/ethnic background 6.80 0.051 0.220
male Male student 6.80 0.512 0.500
School Background 
Characteristicspctblack % of students in school who are black 6.80 0.298 0.236
pcthisp % of students in school who are Hispanic 6.80 0.055 0.064
pctlep % of students in school who are LEP 6.82 0.022 0.039
subgroups Number of subgroups in school 6.81 1.825 2.169
Notes: The ranges for all variables are 0 to 1 except stdmath, -4.66 to 3.65; stdread, -4.11 to 3.13;
pcthisp, 0 to 0.720; pctlep, 0 to 0.605; subgroups, 0 to 8.  Prior achievement indicator variables and 
distributional interaction terms require an additional lagged year for calculation, and thus differ in
observations from accountability pressure variables. Descriptives for distributional interaction terms
shown in table 6. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Levels Value Added Levels Value Added
Accountability Pressure
Failed Growth -0.0630*** -0.0676*** -0.0325*** -0.0367***
(0.00180) (0.00180) (0.00204) (0.00204)
Failed AYP -0.00349 -0.00712* 0.0187*** 0.0204***
(0.00280) (0.00279) (0.00299) (0.00298)
Failed AYP & Growth -0.00424 -0.00503 -0.0131** -0.0130**
(0.00398) (0.00397) (0.00411) (0.00411)
Distributional Effects Among Schools Facing No Negative Pressure
     Less than - 1.5 -0.0448*** -0.0912*** -0.0457*** -0.111***
(0.00411) (0.00412) (0.00750) (0.00763)
     - 1.5 to -1.0 -0.0297*** -0.0681*** -0.0471*** -0.102***
(0.00298) (0.00298) (0.00433) (0.00436)
     -1.0 to -0.5 -0.0198*** -0.0469*** -0.0348*** -0.0760***
(0.00229) (0.00229) (0.00283) (0.00284)
     -0.5 to 0 -0.00602*** -0.0194*** -0.0185*** -0.0402***
(0.00172) (0.00172) (0.00205) (0.00205)
     0.5 to 1.0 0.0203*** 0.0310*** 0.0184*** 0.0366***
(0.00138) (0.00137) (0.00157) (0.00157)
     1.0 to 1.5 0.0395*** 0.0585*** 0.0304*** 0.0638***
(0.00153) (0.00154) (0.00167) (0.00167)
     More than 1.5 0.0618*** 0.0883*** 0.0408*** 0.0905***
(0.00168) (0.00169) (0.00179) (0.00180)
Distributional Effects Among Schools Facing Growth Pressure Only
Failed Growth*Position
     SD Below Grade Level
          Less than - 1.5 0.0365*** 0.0405*** 0.00410 0.00976
(0.00578) (0.00578) (0.0115) (0.0116)
          - 1.5 to -1.0 0.0246*** 0.0274*** 0.000910 0.00432
(0.00430) (0.00430) (0.00647) (0.00649)
          -1.0 to -0.5 0.0201*** 0.0223*** 0.00337 0.00447
(0.00346) (0.00345) (0.00430) (0.00429)
          -0.5 to 0 0.00638* 0.00744** 0.00247 0.00276
(0.00281) (0.00280) (0.00330) (0.00329)
     SD Above Grade Level
          0.5 to 1.0 -0.00445 -0.00470* 0.00292 0.00435
(0.00231) (0.00231) (0.00262) (0.00261)
          1.0 to 1.5 0.00440 0.00483* 0.00695** 0.00888***
(0.00239) (0.00239) (0.00263) (0.00262)
          More than 1.5 0.0183*** 0.0203*** 0.00936*** 0.0105***
(0.00233) (0.00233) (0.00244) (0.00243)
SD Above Grade Level
SD Below Grade Level





Distributional Effects Among Schools Facing Status Pressure Only Table 3, continued
Failed AYP*Position
     SD Below Grade Level
          Less than - 1.5 0.0341** 0.0438*** 0.00680 0.0119
(0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0172) (0.0174)
          - 1.5 to -1.0 0.0335*** 0.0395*** 0.0206* 0.0273**
(0.00727) (0.00724) (0.00932) (0.00935)
          -1.0 to -0.5 0.0290*** 0.0345*** 0.0199** 0.0268***
(0.00551) (0.00549) (0.00618) (0.00620)
          -0.5 to 0 0.00980* 0.0127** 0.0158*** 0.0208***
(0.00433) (0.00431) (0.00469) (0.00469)
     SD Above Grade Level
          0.5 to 1.0 -0.00198 -0.00205 -0.0160*** -0.0181***
(0.00329) (0.00328) (0.00362) (0.00361)
          1.0 to 1.5 0.00146 0.00260 -0.0299*** -0.0342***
(0.00327) (0.00327) (0.00355) (0.00354)
          More than 1.5 -0.000122 0.00381 -0.0388*** -0.0424***
(0.00304) (0.00304) (0.00321) (0.00321)
Distributional Effects Among Schools Facing Growth and Status Pressure
Failed AYP & Growth*Position
     SD Below Grade Level
          Less than - 1.5 0.0322* 0.0368* -0.0189 -0.0296
(0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0228) (0.0231)
          - 1.5 to -1.0 0.0210* 0.0268* -0.0194 -0.0232
(0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0127) (0.0127)
          -1.0 to -0.5 0.00165 0.00388 -0.00591 -0.00690
(0.00786) (0.00783) (0.00861) (0.00862)
          -0.5 to 0 0.00592 0.00639 -0.00184 -0.00307
(0.00634) (0.00632) (0.00667) (0.00666)
     SD Above Grade Level
          0.5 to 1.0 -0.0105* -0.0111* 0.00358 0.00260
(0.00496) (0.00494) (0.00534) (0.00532)
          1.0 to 1.5 -0.0227*** -0.0241*** 0.00694 0.00550
(0.00497) (0.00496) (0.00532) (0.00529)
          More than 1.5 -0.0326*** -0.0345*** 0.0111* 0.0101*
(0.00464) (0.00463) (0.00479) (0.00477)
Intercept 0.0148*** 0.0137*** -0.0113*** -0.0141***
(0.00207) (0.00211) (0.00220) (0.00226)
N 4478689 4475403 4481213 4470088
R² 0.2321 0.2043 0.076 0.4726
Notes: Student fixed effects models; the value added specification differs from the levels specification by the 
inclusion of a prior year test score in the specified subject; robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05,  ** 
p<0.01,  *** p<0.001;  The models also include the following controls: student was gifted, received special 
education services, had limited English proficiency, was new to the school, school percent black, percent 





Table 4. Weighted Distributional Effects by Accountability Regime
Levels Val Add Levels Val Add Levels Val Add
Growth Pressure
Below 0.0041 0.0046 0.0006 0.0009 0.0024 0.0027
Above 0.0039 0.0043 0.0039 0.0047 0.0039 0.0045
Status Pressure
Below 0.0033 0.0041 0.0034 0.0045 0.0034 0.0043
Above -0.0002 0.0013 -0.0197 -0.0219 -0.0099 -0.0103
Growth and Status Pressure
Below 0.0016 0.0019 -0.0016 -0.0020 0.0000 -0.0001
Above -0.0160 -0.0169 0.0045 0.0038 -0.0057 -0.0065
Math Reading Math & Reading
Note: Cell values are calculated from the coefficients shown in table 3, weighted by the proportion of cases within 




Variable Description Obs (in 
millions)
Mean SD
nayplr4 notayp*lr4 4.61 0.002 0.050
nayplr3 notayp*lr3 4.61 0.006 0.079
nayplr2 notayp*lr2 4.61 0.011 0.106
nayplr1 notayp*lr1 4.61 0.019 0.137
nayphr2 notayp*hr2 4.61 0.047 0.211
nayphr3 notayp*hr3 4.61 0.045 0.208
nayphr4 notayp*hr4 4.61 0.078 0.268
nayplm4 notayp*lm4 4.63 0.002 0.048
nayplm3 notayp*lm3 4.63 0.007 0.083
nayplm2 notayp*lm2 4.63 0.014 0.119
nayplm1 notayp*lm1 4.63 0.025 0.156
nayphm2 notayp*hm2 4.63 0.042 0.201
nayphm3 notayp*hm3 4.63 0.039 0.194
nayphm4 notayp*hm4 4.63 0.072 0.259
nglr4 notgrow *lr4 4.60 0.009 0.092
nglr3 notgrow *lr3 4.60 0.015 0.121
nglr2 notgrow *lr2 4.60 0.024 0.153
nglr1 notgrow *lr1 4.60 0.038 0.190
nghr2 notgrow *hr2 4.60 0.067 0.250
nghr3 notgrow *hr3 4.60 0.056 0.229
nghr4 notgrow *hr4 4.60 0.072 0.259
nglm4 notgrow *lm4 4.61 0.004 0.060
nglm3 notgrow *lm3 4.61 0.011 0.105
nglm2 notgrow *lm2 4.61 0.024 0.153
nglm1 notgrow *lm1 4.61 0.042 0.201
nghm2 notgrow *hm2 4.61 0.063 0.243
nghm3 notgrow *hm3 4.61 0.053 0.225
nghm4 notgrow *hm4 4.61 0.077 0.266
nbothlr4 notboth *lr4 4.61 0.001 0.036
nbothlr3 notboth *lr3 4.61 0.003 0.055
nbothlr2 notboth *lr2 4.61 0.006 0.077
nbothlr1 notboth *lr1 4.61 0.010 0.098
nbothhr2 notboth *hr2 4.61 0.022 0.147
nbothhr3 notboth *hr3 4.61 0.020 0.140
nbothhr4 notboth *hr4 4.63 0.031 0.174
nbothlm4 notboth *lm4 4.63 0.001 0.038
nbothlm3 notboth *lm3 4.63 0.004 0.063
nbothlm2 notboth *lm2 4.63 0.008 0.088
nbothlm1 notboth *lm1 4.63 0.013 0.115
nbothhm2 notboth *hm2 4.63 0.020 0.139
nbothhm3 notboth *hm3 4.63 0.017 0.127
nbothhm4 notboth *hm4 4.63 0.026 0.159
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of Distributional 
Interaction Terms
Note: range for all interaction terms is 0 to 1. Entered as one-
year lags.
 
